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POWER OF COURTS TO RESTRAIN SALE
OF PLEDGED COLLATERAL
JOSEPi

E. RAPKIN

T

HE power of a creditor to sell, under a power of sale conferred
upon him, collateral pledged to secure payment of his claim
affords a means of collection which is attractive ta the creditor, not
only by reason of the savings in legal expense that may be accomplished but also by virtue of the assurance of ready liquidation at such
time as the pledgee himself might determine to be propitious.
The protection of this power is, therefore, of great concern to the
creditor class. Aside from certain instances, hereinafter referred to, in
bankruptcy, equity receiverships and other insolvency proceedings, the
exercise of this power was enjoined by the courts only where the
validity of the pledge agreement was itself questioned., Even in connection with bankruptcy matters, the right of the pledgee to proceed
under the pledge agreement could be interfered with only through
a plenary proceeding and then only in limited circumstances The
power of a court of bankruptcy to deal summarily with property of
the bankrupt depended upon the court's having first succeeded to the
possession of the bankrupt over the property.3
The secured creditor was rewarded for his diligence in procuring
security for his claim not only by having the security itself but by
receiving for it a legislative declaration of independence4 except insofar as interference was permitted in order to determine the value of
the security 5
149 C.J. 1011.

§§ 96(b),
107(e), 110(e). See also Southwestern Lumber Co. v. Kerr, 11 F. Supp. 253
(S.D. Tex. 1934); 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3rd ed.) 515, 5 id. at 410.
3
Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. Inc., v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 44 Sup. Ct. 396, 68
L.ed. 770 (1924) ; Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000,
44 L.ed. 1175 (1900); Whitney v. Wenmann, 198 U.S. 538, 25 Sup. Ct. 778,
49 L.ed. 1157 (1905) ; First National Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198
U.S. 280, 25 Sup. Ct. 693, 49 L.ed. 1051 (1905); In re Hudson River Nay.
Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932); 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
(3rd ed.) 410.
4Section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(d).
5 Section 57(h) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 93(h) ; In re Mertens, 144
Fed. 818, 823 (C.C.A. 2d, 1906), aff'd Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S. 28,
27 Sup. Ct. 281, 51 L.ed. 945 (1907). A sale of mortgaged property could be
restrained in a bankruptcy proceeding only if there was an actual or potential equity that might be sacrificed if the sale were to take place. See In re
Morris White Holding Co., 52 F. (2d) 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Central States
Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar, 80 F. (2d) 754 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935). As to the similar
rule in equity receiverships see International Banking Corp. v. Lynch, 269
Fed. 242 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galveston etc. R. R., 87
Fed. 813 (C.C.A. 5th, 1898); contra, Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments,
Inc., 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N.D. Ill, 1932), ren'd on other grounds in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C.C.A. 7th, 1932).
2 Sections 60(b), 67(e) and 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A.
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The special privilege so accorded the pledgee was recognized by
most courts, and some of the decisions which were decided after the
1933 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act were enacted recognized that
before those laws were passed the pledgee had the right to the free
7
exercise of his power.
The practical value of the existence of this right and the probable
adverse effect of the denial of its exercise by the pledgee were recognized by at least one court8 which pointed out that nothing would be
more disturbing to such transactions than a failure to preserve the
exercise of this right to the pledgee. The same court said further, 9
"Millions of dollars are daily lent on like collateral, which fluctuates
from hour to hour; unless the pledgee is free to choose his time to sell,
his security may disappear . . . The pledgee, having taken possession
of the documents, supposes himself for just that reason to be the sole
judge of his necessities and lends on that understanding."
Debtors are often unduly optimistic as to the future values of their
depreciated property delivered in pledge. Their optimism and hope,
often shared by unsecured creditors, that time would bring higher
values and that the pledgee should be restrained pending the event
were not shared nor considered sufficient justification to warrant the
court in staying the pledgee from exercising his right. Thus, the
Supreme Court of California 0 said: " . . . The pledgor is not justified
in asking that the exercise of this right be deferred indefinitely to
await a purely problematical increase in the price which might be
realized at a sale. Nor are the general creditors of the alleged bankrupt entitled to this indulgence... "
There were, however, some decisions rendered before the 1933
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act were passed which were able to
justify the imposition of a restraint on the exercise by the pledgee of
his right to sell.*" Most of these decisions have rested upon the admit6Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S. 28, 27 Sup. Ct. 778, 49 L.ed. 1157 (1907) ;
Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U.S. 734, 24 L.ed. 136 (1876); In re Hudson River
Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932); In re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836
(C.C.A. 2d, 1907) ; In re Browne, 104 Fed. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1900). Relative to
equity receiverships see International Banking Co. v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 242

(C.C.A. 9th, 1920); Nor. Pac. Ry. v. Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 150 (W.D.
Wash. 1922).
7 In re Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 72 F. (2d) 443, 449 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934),
aff'd Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Co., 294 U.S.

648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 79 L.ed. 1110 (1935); Molina v. Murphy, 71 F. (2d)
605, 607 (C.C.A. 1st, 1934) ; In re Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929, 936 (C.C.A. 7th,

1934).

In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
See note 8, supra.
'o Griffin v. Smith, 177 Cal. 481, 171 Pac. 92 (1918).
21In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453 (S.D. Pa. 1931); cf. Note (1931) 80 PA. LAW
REv. 123; 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTcY (3rd ed. Supp.) 288; Allebach v.
Thomas 16 F. (2d) 853 (C.C.A. 4th, 1927); In re Cobb, 96 Fed. 821 (E.D.
N.C. 1899) ; Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, Inc., 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N.D.
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ted power of a bankruptcy court to prevent a mortgagee from foreclosing his lien after the bankruptcy of the mortgagor3 These decisions have been the subject of vigorous criticism by reason of their
alleged failure to distinguish between the nature of a pledge as distinguished from a mortgage type of security arrangement.3
That there is a vast difference in the commercial function of these
two types of security methods is unquestioned. Although both furnish
security to the lender, the pledge transaction, although not necessarily
limited to short term loans is generally associated with such loans. The
mortgage form of security is generally in use where the prime concern
is the ultimate security rather than rapid liquidation. In the pledge type
of arrangement, the property pledged is usually of such nature as to
be capable of quick disposal to outsiders and the free use of the power
of sale is therefore of vital importance. In the mortgage transaction
the security is generally less saleable. The mortgage customarily
secures long term debts of such magnitude that the security is not
often sold for cash but rather, in view of difficulty in raising the necessary cash, the foreclosure results in re-financing or re-organization.
Even where the mortgage does contain a power of sale, therefore, this
power is rarely exercised. In the case of the pledge device, the loans
secured are often of emergency nature-to carry the borrower through
a short period of unexpected financial need. The lending agency in the
latter type is most often of the type that is interested in liquid loans.
Unfortunately, however, except for a few cases, 4 the distinctions
between the function and nature of a pledge as against a mortgage
transaction have not been stressed by the courts nor even considered.
The courts which have denied injunctions against pledges have rested
their decisions upon the circumstance that the debtor did not have
Ill. 1932), rev'd by Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C.C.A.
7th, 1932). See also In re Mitchell, 278 Fed. 707 (C.C.A. 2d, 1922) and In re
Purkett, Douglas & Co., 50 F. (2d) 435 (S.D. Cal. 1931), where the validity
of the pledge was contested. The last case, unless distinguishable because the
validity of the pledge was involved, would be contrary to a decision by the
governing Circuit Court of Appeals in International Banking Corp. v. Lynch,
269 Fed. 242 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920). As to the case of In re Cobb, supra, it has
been pointed out that this decision was rendered before the case of Bardes v.
Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 778, 49 L.ed. 1157 (1905).
32 See Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Lumber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 51 Sup. Ct. 270, 75 L.ed.
645 (1931); Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 51 Sup. Ct. 465, 75 L.ed. 1060
(1931); In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453 (E.D. Pa. 1931); Continental Illinois
Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 79
L.ed. 1110 (1935).
13 McGinnis, Sale of Collateral Security by the Pledgee Thereof after the Intervention of the Bankruptcy of the Pledgor (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 195; Howland,
The Enforcement of Secured Creditors' Claims under 77 and 77B: a Functional Analysis (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1109.
4
' In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932);" Rogers,
Brown & Co. v. Tindel Morris Co., 271 Fed. 475 (FD. Pa. 1921); see also
In re Chaiken, 10 A. B. REv. 14 (Pa. 1933).
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possession of the pledged property at the time of the filing of the
petition. 5
This failure of the courts to recognize the distinctions noted and
to make them play a part as a basis of decisions did not result in any
difficulties before the enactment of the 1933 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act inasmuch as the general rule denying any right to restrain
the pledgee from exercising his power of sale was in accord with the
result desired by business. The struggle that always comes into existence in these situations between secured creditors on the one hand
and the debtor and the unsecured creditors on the other was generally
decided in accordance with the intention of the debtor and the secured
creditor at the time the arrangements were made.
During the years of the depression, 'however, when there was a
sacrifice of equities, the courts were able to find in the new amendments a basis upon which to restrain creditors from pursuing their
remedies under pledge contracts. Sections 74, 77 and 77B all" gave
the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the debtor's property wherever
located. The debtor's equity was held to be "property" within the type
contemplated by those sections."" In order to avoid interference with
the preparation and consummation of a workable plan of reorganization, the assertion and exercise of a power to enjoin the pledgee at
least temporarily is now considered permissible.
In the Rock Island cases, the Supreme Court definitely abandoned, as to the proceedings before it, the theory that where the
pledgee was in possession no injunction could be issued and that the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court depended upon the security being
in the possession of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. Legislative
basis for its decision was found by the court in the provision of Section
77(a) that the bankruptcy court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction of
the debtor and its property wherever located," and also in the general
provisions of Section 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section 262 of
the Judicial Code, upon neither of which reliance had previously been
placed.:"
The rule of the Rock Island cases has been extended to proceedings
under Sections 77B1 and 74.20 As previously indicated these Sections
1-5Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U.S. 734, 24 L.ed. 136 (1876) ; Hiscock v. Varick Nat.

Bank, 206 U.S. 28, 27 Sup. Ct. 778, 49 L.ed. 1157 (1907) ; In re Hudson River

Nay. Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Galves-

ton City R. R., 87 Fed. 813 (C.C.A. 8th, 1898); International Banking Corp.
v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 242 (C.C.A. 9th, 1920).

26 Sections 74(m), 77(a) and 77(B) (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 202(m), 205(a) and 207(a).
71See the cases cited in note 7, supra.

13 See Howland, The Enforcement of Secured Creditors' Claims under 77 and

77B: a FunctionalAnalysis (1937) 46 YAL. L. J. 1109.
In re Prudence Co. Inc., 82 F. (2d) 755 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936).
20 In re Brown, 84 F. (2d) 433 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
9
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(74 and 77) also declare that the bankruptcy court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located.2
Section 77B contains no provisions inconsistent with such a declaration. As to Section 74, however, there is, at least, room for difference
of opinion as to whether or not other provisions of the act do not
so limit the clause similar to that contained in Sections 77 and 77B as
to make the rule of the Rock Island cases inapplicable thereto. And,
as hereafter indicated,2 several courts have refused to enjoin pledgees
from exercising their power of sale in proceeding under Section 74.
Unlike Section 77, words of limitation appear throughout Section 74
whenever reference is made to secured creditors. Thus, subdivision(e)
of Section 74 refers not to all secured creditors, but only to those
"proposed to be affected by an extension proposal." Subdivision (g),
likewise, directs confirmation of a proposal by the court if satisfied
that it "includes an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for
secured creditors whose claims are affected. .. " Subdivision (i) provides that upon its confirmation "an extension proposal shall be binding upon the debtor and his unsecured and secured creditors affected
thereby . . . " Subdivision (n) provides that the court "may enjoin

secured creditors who may be affected by the extension proposal from
proceeding in any court for the enforcement of their claims

. .

. " An

express distinction between types of secured creditors is made by subdivision (h) which, in part, declares that the "terms of an extension
proposal may extend the time of payment of either or both unsecured
debts and secured debts the security for which is in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor

. .

. " (Author's italics.)

From the foregoing, and especially in view of the express provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 74 it would seem apparent that
Section 74 affects only those secured creditors whose debtors are in
actual or constructive possession of the security. It would further
appear that under Section 74 there is express reservation of the principle, abandoned by the Supreme Court in the Rock Island cases, in
the proceeding there involved, that the court's jurisdiction depended
upon possession of the security having been had by the debtor at the
time of bankruptcy.
The correctness of the foregoing conclusions as to the scope of
Section 74 is further evidenced by a study of the legislative history of
Section 74. Thus, in noting an amendment to a part of the bill which
later became Section 74 so that-only secured creditors whose debtors
held the security would be affected, the Senate Report says: "It was
21 See note 16, supra.
22 See text p. 200, infra.
3 SEN. REP. No. 1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1935).
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believed that if every form of collateral that was deposited as a security for a loan should be subject to review by the court in any proceedings under this act it could but result in a greater value of collateral
being required by the person or institution granting the loan in the first
instance. The tendency would be to further restrict credit."'' Secured
creditors of any kind were brought in only after most careful deliberaion.' 5
Further aid in support of the conclusion that pledgees of security
were not intended to be affected by Section 74 is to be derived by
comparing subdivisions 74(h) and 74(n) as originally proposed with
the same subdivisions as finally enacted. Thus, as originally passed by
the House of Representatives Section 74(n) read :26 "After the filing of
the petition, as provided in subdivision (a) of this section, the court,
on such notice and upon such terms, if any, as it deems fair and
equitable may enjoin secured creditors from enforcing their rights in
the security held by them until the confirmation of the composition, or
the extension has been approved by the court."
As finally passed Section 74(n) reads:26 "In addition to the provisions of Section 29 of this title for the staying of pending suits, the
court, on such notice and on such terms, if any, as it deems fair and
equitable, may enjoin secured creditors who may be affected by the
extension proposal from proceeding in any court for the enforcement
of their claims until the extension has been confirmed or denied by the
court."
As originally passed by the House of Representatives, Section
74(h) read:26 "The terms of an extension proposal may extend the
time of payment of either secured or unsecured debts or both."
As finally enacted the same subsection reads :26 "The terms of an
extension proposal may extend the time of payment of either or both
unsecured debts and secured debts the security for which is in the
actual or constructive possession of the debtor... "
There have been decisions which interpreted Section 74 as not
affecting all secured creditors but only those whose debtors had actual
or constructive possession of the security. Thus, in In re Doelger27 a
creditor moved the court for an order vacating an ex parte injunction
obtained by the debtor which enjoined the creditor from selling certain
securities in its possession as pledgee to secure payment of the debt.
The court stated the problem thus: " . . . The question presented is

whether the new Act affects the creditors' freedom of recourse to the
24See note 23, supra.
25See Senator Hasting's speech, 76 CONG. Rtc. 5030 (1933).
6 See In re Doelger, 9 A. B. REv. 329 (D.C. N.Y. 1933).

27See case cited in note 26, supra, and also In re Chaiken, 10 A. B. REv. 14
(Pa. 1933).
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security pledged, and particularly whether the court is authorized to
enjoin a sale of such security." And, after referring to subdivisions
(h) and (n) of Section 74, the court continued: "Under these express
provisions it seems clear that the court's power to enjoin is restricted
to court proceedings; and that an extension may be obtained only of
secured debts, the security for which is in the actual or constructive
pessession of the debtor, a custodian or receiver. Neither of these differences is applicable to the creditor here involved."
Both of the court's last conclusions are supported by its comparison
of the subdivisions as originally proposed and as finally enacted. It
even considered the statute too clear to require consideration of legislators' statements as an aid to arriving at the correct construction of
the relevant statutes.28
The decision of the court in the Doelger case in effect holds that the
provision of Section 74(n) which provides that the filing of the
debtor's petition or answer seeking relief thereunder "shall subject
the debtor and his property, wherever located, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court" is limited by Section 74(n) in its prescription as
to the types of secured creditors affected in such proceedings. A similare limitation upon Section 74(m) is the result of the decision in In
re Landquist (In re Parmenter).29 In this case, decided before Section
74(m) was amended in June, 1934, it appears that the debtor, before
the proceedings under Section 74 had been taken, surrendered possession of her real estate to the trustee under the trust deed who in
turn delivered possession thereof to a receiver appointed by the state
court in foreclosure proceedings. The appellate court reversed the
lower court decision holding that the foreclosure proceedings could be
enjoined, the court pointing out: 3 "Actual or constructive possession
of the security by the debtor is a prerequisite to relief under Section
74 of the Bankruptcy Act . . . (T)

his is a secured debt and before

the debtor is entitled to ask for an extension, it must appear that he
is in either actual or constructive possession of the security. We hold,
under the circumstances here presented, that appellee was not in actual
or constructive possession ... The only right which appellee now has
in the security is that of redemption. To hold otherwise we think
would extend the application of Section 74 much further than was contemplated by Congress."
However, after the rendition of this decision, and probably to avoid
its effect, Section 74(m) was amended on June 7, 1934, the new portion reading: "And this shall include property of the debtor in the
8 In re Doelger, supra, note 26.
of Landquist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) ; see also Molina v.
Murphy, 71 F. (2d) 605 (C.C.A. 9th, 1934).
- 70 F. (2d) 929, 936 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934).

29 Matter
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possession of a trustee under a trust deed or mortgage, or a receiver,
custodian or other officer in a pending cause irrespective of the date
of the appointment of such receiver or other officer, or the date of the
institution of such proceedings... "
This amendment is, in the factual situations there indicated, in conflict which Section 74(h) in so far as the latter indicates that only
secured creditors whose debtors are in actual or constructive possession of the security are affected by such proceedings. In such a situation Section 74(m), as amended, should and has been held to control
over Section 74(h).1 The decision of the court in the Landquist case
is now no longer permissible in the same factual circumstances. However, the next query is: What effect has the amendment of June 7,
1934 to Section 74(m) upon a pledgee when he is not being "a trustee
under a trust deed of mortgage, or a receiver, custodian or other
officer" indicated in the amendment and upon the rule of the Landquist
case and In re Doelger and In re Chaiken?
A literal interpretation of the amendment would lead to the conclusion that pledges were still out of the reach of the court in a proceeding under Section 74 and that the congressional desire to keep
credit unrestricted 32 still is the reason for granting such immunity.
However, in In the Matter of Edward Othniel Brown,

3

which was

decided after this amendment to Section 74(m) the court held, without reference to Section 74(h) and decisions construing it, that the
decision in the Rock Island cases construing Section 77(a), as
amended, was applicable in a proceeding under Section 74 and that the
similar provision of 74(m) should be similarly construed. 4
The effect of this decision, unless it be limited to its facts only, is
that in proceedings under Section 74, the provision of Section 74(h)
indicating the types of secured creditors affected by such a proceeding
is not a bar to the issuance of an injunction by the court restraining
pledgees from exercising their power to sell property pledged with
them by the debtor before sufficient time had been allowed the debtor
a'In re Kusel, 75 F. (2d) 314, 315 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934) ; In re Jacobs, 7 F. Supp.
749, 751, 752 (N.D. Il1. 1934).
32 See note 23, supra.
3 In re Brown, 84 F. (2d) 433 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936). Unless the power to enjoin
is not dependent upon the court's power to extend payment of debts, as to
which see In re Ward, 104 Fed. 985 (D.C. Mass. 1900), the language of this
decision is not in accord with the thought expressed by at least one text
writer who in writing about the types of secured creditors who can be affected
by a proceeding under Section 74 said: "As to secured debts there is the important limitation that the security must be in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor or of the custodian or receiver. For example, a mortgagee's right to forclose on land in the debtor's possession may be deferred,
but not the right of a bank to sell securities held by it as collateral." COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY (13th ed. 1935 Supp.) 757.
84 F. (2d) 433, 435 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
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within which to prepare a plan, where a sale would result in irreparable
loss and where the result to be accomplished by the proceeding would
be hindered.
Although this decision is ostensibly based on the decision in the
Rock Island cases and the fact that Section 74(m) is similar to Section 77 (a) construed by the Supreme Court, it would seem that the
court was at least to some extent adopting the reasoning of the minority view which makes no distinction between a mortgage and a pledge
type of security transaction.35 The Act itself provides 36 that "except
as otherwise provided therein, the jurisdiction and powers of the
court, the title . . . of its officers . . . and the rights and liabilities

of creditors, and of all persons with respect to the property of the
debtor.., shall be the same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication
had been filed... " The power of the court with respect to the debtor's
property would, by this provision, seem to be limited by restrictions
thereon otherwise present in the Bankruptcy Act as, for example, by
Section 57(h) which provides for the method of liquidation of a
pledgee's securities. That such limitation does exist would especially
appear where Section 74(h) seems so expressly to limit the types of
creditors who can be affected by the proceeding. Even more correctly
in a proceeding under Section 74 than in a proceeding under Section
7731 may it then be said that the question for determination depends
less upon Section 74 as furnishing jurisdiction over the pledged property than "upon the validity of the arguments as to the power of the
court to enjoin a pledgee from exercising his power of sale apart from"
Section 74.
, Upon the facts recited in the opinion by the court in the case of
In the Matter of Edward Othniel Brown,s which indicate that the
creditor held collateral of the approximate value of $240,000" to
secure a claim of but approximately$80,000, the power to restrain the
pledgee might have been rested upon language of the Supreme Court
in the case of Hiscock v. Varick Bank,40 in which the court intimated
that a wanton sacrifice might justify the inference of a fraudulent purpose and warrant interference with the pledgee's power of sale.4 '
If the decision in the Brown case be not limited to its facts the
danger, in periods of financial stress, that may follow the ready
25 See notes 11 and 12, supra.
36 Section 74(m) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 202(m).
7 -See Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 677.
3n See In re Brown, 84 F. (2d) 433 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936).
39See In re Brown, supra note 38 at page 435, where the court said: "The evidence fails to disclose the true value of the pledged securities. The District
Court found, however, that the book value of such securities was $588,000."
40 Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U.S. 28, 27 Sup. Ct. 778, 49 L.ed. 1157 (1907).
41
In re Browne, 104 Fed. (E.D. Pa. 762). See also 2 REmINGTON, BAxxRxuFTcY
(3rd ed.) 320; 5 id, 703-704.
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issuance of injunctions restraining sale of collateral held by pledgees
is indeed great. The sources of short term credit must not be so
threatened with the possibility of injunctions that short term creditors
will seek protection in recourse to foreclosure of the pledge as soon
as the debtor shows signs of financial difficulties. Loans to debtors
temporarily in need will not be so readily forthcoming. Debtors may,
as a result, be forced into bankruptcy rather than be able to forestall
such an end or be able to rehabilitate themselves.
The assurance and warning given by the courts 42 that the plan

of rehabilitation should not be unduly delayed and that in case of a
change in circumstances the creditor shall be relieved of the restraint
hardly suffices to preserve the incentive to a debtor to prepare and
consummate a plan which a threat to sell does preserve. Sympathies
are naturally most often with the debtor and the possibility of an
overexercise of sympathy quite likely. Whether creation of a definite
maximum time limit within which the debtor must present a workable
plan of rehabilitation would be a better safeguard against the damage
that may result from delay than the present rule which leaves the
matter to the discretion of the court may be questionable. On the whole
it is probably better and of greater importance to facilitate rehabilitation of debtors than to preserve the integrity of the pledge transaction. The danger of a failure to protect the pledgees' interest is
however such that definite rules must be established to protect the
pledge transaction from falling into disfavor with creditors by reason
of a failure of the courts to recognize its tremendous value and use
in the business world.

In re Sterba,
(C.C.A. 7th,
(C.C.A. 7th,
Co., 294 U.S.

74 F. (2d) 413 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) ; In re Brown 84 F. (2d) 433
1936); In re Chicago, R I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 72 F. (2d) 443
1934); Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Chicago, etc.,
648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 79 L.ed. 1110 (1935).

